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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Shane Erick Crawford appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdicts 
finding him guilty of two counts of lewd conduct. Crawford complains that the district 
court (1) erred in its response to the jury's question of whether touching the breast area 
constitutes manual-to-genital contact by failing to clarify that it does not; and (2) 
imposed an excessive sentence. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The state charged Crawford with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under 
sixteen, and two counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen. (R., pp.11-
12.) In Count I, the victim was As.C. (dob , and the victim in Counts II through IV 
was her older sister, An.C. (dob  (R., pp.11-12; Tr., p.196, Ls.1-4; p.237, L.22 
- p.238, L.5.) An.C. and As.C. are Crawford's daughters, and they lived with Crawford 
together with their mother (and Crawford's wife), Tracy Crawford, four other siblings and 
their paternal grandmother. (Tr .. p.196, Ls.11-16; p.220, Ls.12-17; p.238, Ls.6-10.) 
As.C. testified that two months before July 2009, she and Crawford were lying on 
a couch in their home, watching a movie. (Tr., p.196, L.19 - p.197, L.25; p.199, Ls.2-
20.) According to As.C., Crawford "started reaching up my shirt and groping my breasts 
and then he started going down into my panties and began touching my vagina." (Tr., 
p.199, Ls.23-25.) She then asked Crawford if she could go upstairs to play video 
games wither her younger sister, and went to her own bedroom instead, where she told 
her older sister, An.C., that Crawford was making her feel uncomfortable, but did not tell 
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her specifically what had just occurred. (Tr., p.201, L.22 - p.202, L.25.) As.C. later told 
"[e]very detail" of the incident to her grandmother, who then went with As.C. to tell her 
mother what had happened. (Tr., p.203, L.4 - p.204, L.5.) It was decided by As.C.'s 
grandmother and mother that As.C. should keep the incident a secret, which As.C. did. 
(Tr., p.204, Ls.2-14.) 
An.C. testified that Crawford touched her inappropriately on several occasions. 
First, when An.C. was about 13 years old and starting to develop, he touched her upper 
thigh, close to her "private area."1 (Tr., p.238, L.20 - p.239, L.20.) An.C. further 
explained that when Crawford was rubbing her leg he was getting close to her 
underwear, and acknowledged that "he was up there to [her) privates." (Tr., p.241, L.20 
- p.242, L.2.) An.C. told her grandmother about the touching, but after her grandmother 
told her not to pay any attention to it, and that Crawford was just showing his affection, 
An.C. did not tell anyone else at that time. (Tr., p.240, Ls.1-5.) 
An.C. recalled a time when she was in the eighth grade and was in the kitchen of 
their home with Crawford. (Tr., p.242, Ls. 2-11.) Crawford offered her an alcoholic 
drink, but she refused. (Tr., p.242, Ls.14-15.) Crawford askedAn.C. if she knew what a 
"clit" was and she told him she did not. (Tr., p.242, Ls.16-18.) He then said, "Well, let 
me show you," and as An.C. backed away, Crawford "went to go show [her]," and 
touched "[o)utside of [her] vaginal area" by using his hands to go up her shorts. (Tr., p. 
243, Ls.10-19.) An.C. told Crawford she was going to bed, and went upstairs to bed. 
(Tr., p.243, Ls.22-23.) 
1 An.C. did not explain where the incident occurred. (See Tr., p.238, L.20 - p. 240, 
L.5.) 
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Next, An.C. testified that when she was about 13, she would be sitting on the 
couch watching television, when Crawford would join her, put a blanket over both of 
them, and rub her upper thigh - moving his hand upward toward her privates and 
"outside of [her] bikini line." (Tr., p.244, L.17 - p.245, L.21.) In An.C.'s words, "I would 
tell [Crawford] that I needed to go to the bathroom and I'd stay up there for, like, ten 
minutes and - or I'd tell him that I needed to go get a drink or - and that's how it would 
usually stop." (Tr., p.246, Ls.4-8.) Crawford would get upset when An.C. would remove 
his hand from her vaginal area and would tell her she would have to give his cell phone, 
which she frequently borrowed, back to him. (Tr., p.246, L.11 - p.247, L.3.) Sometimes 
Crawford would pull An.C. into the garage and tell her to keep the touching incidents to 
herself and not to tell her mother; one time he explained he had been drinking a lot, his 
behavior was wrong, and he was sorry. (Tr., p.247, Ls.6-25.) 
Around Christmas 2008, An.C. and two of her brothers were wrapping gifts for 
their mother in Crawford's master bedroom. When her brothers left the bedroom to 
place their gifts next to the Christmas tree, Crawford exposed his penis to An.C. and 
said something about having shaved certain areas. (Tr., p.249, L.7 - p.250, L.18; 
p.258, Ls.18-23.) An.C. turned her head away, and Crawford nudged her saying, "Just 
look at it." (Tr., p.250, Ls.13-18.) When the brothers returned to the bedroom, Crawford 
put his penis back in his pants before they noticed it. (Id.) 
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On another (unspecified) occasion,2 Crawford invited friends over to watch 
televised UFC ("Ultimate Fight Championship") matches. (Tr., p.251, Ls.12-24.) While 
one of his friends was present, Crawford grabbed An.C.'s left breast in "like a ha-ha, 
funny type of way," which embarrassed An.C. (Tr., p.252, L.5 - p. 253, L.11.) 
Finally, Crawford was home and talking to An.C.'s ill grandfather on the phone, 
when he gave the phone to An.C. and told her speak to her grandfather. (Tr., p.253, 
L.22 - p.254, L.8.) While An.C. talked on the phone, Crawford started rubbing her 
stomach, and "would start moving toward [her] shirt and [she] kept having to push his 
hand away numerous times." (Tr., p.254, Ls.9-13.) When asked during cross-
examination whether Crawford had tried to rub her breasts, An.C. answered that "[h]e 
would move - he would move his hand, like, toward my breast, but I would push his 
hand away before he did." (Tr., p.256, L.22 - p.257, L.2.) 
After the presentation of evidence, the jury found Crawford guilty of both counts 
of lewd conduct, and acquitted him of the remaining counts. (R., pp.121-124.) The 
district court imposed concurrent unified twenty-five year sentences with six years fixed 
on the lewd conduct counts. (R., pp.164-68.) Crawford filed a timely appeal. (R., 
pp.170-172.) 
2 An.C. testified, "I don't remember the place that he grabbed it, but he grabbed it," 
referring to which room they were in at the time. (Tr., p.252, Ls.5-11.) 
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ISSUES 
Crawford states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court deny Mr. Crawford's right to due process of 
law by incorrectly instructing the jury, by failing to clarify, in 
response to a jury question, that the breast area is not a "genital" 
for purposes of the lewd and lascivious conduct charges? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon Mr. 
Crawford, unified sentences of twenty-five years, with six years 
fixed, following his conviction for two counts of lewd conduct? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Crawford failed to show reversible error in the district court's response to the 
jury's question of whether touching the breast area constitutes genital contact? 
2. Has Crawford failed to establish his sentences are excessive? 
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I. 
Crawford Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Instructing 
The Jury To Reread The Instructions In Response To The Jury's Question Of Whether 
Touching The Breast Area Constitutes Genital Contact 
A. Introduction 
Crawford argues on appeal that "the district court denied him his right to due 
process of law by incorrectly instructing the jury, by failing to clarify, in response to a 
jury question, that the breast area is not a 'genital' for purposes of lewd and lascivious 
conduct charges." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Crawford's argument is misplaced because 
(1) the district court did not erroneously instruct the jury, and (2) it did not abuse its 
discretion by telling the jury to reread the instructions instead of defining the commonly 
understood meaning of the word "genitals." Even assuming it was error for the district 
court not to instruct the jury that breasts are not genitals, such error is harmless relative 
to Count II because that count did not involve any allegation, evidence, or argument that 
An.C.'s breasts were touched. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 265, 16 P.3d 937, 
941 (Ct. App. 2000). To be reversible error, any error in the jury instructions must have 
misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 
955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998). "In general, it is within the trial court's discretion to 
determine whether, and the manner in which, to respond to a question posed by the jury 
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during deliberations." State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 282, 77 P.3d 956, 971 (2003) 
(quoting Statev. Pinkney, 115 Idaho 1152, 1154, 772 P.2d 1246, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989)). 
C. Crawford Has Failed To Show Reversible Error In The District Court's Response 
To The Jury's Question 
During its deliberations, the jury submitted a question to the district court, asking: 
In order to have committed manual-genital contact does it require 
touching the vaginal area? 
Does touching of breast-area constitute manual-genital contact? 
(Jury Question #3 (emphasis original), Order Granting Mot. to Aug. the Record, 
12/13/11.) The following discussion about how to respond to the jury's questions 
ensued: 
THE COURT: We have two more questions. Question No. 3, "In order to 
have committed manual-genital contact, does it require touching the 
vaginal area? Does touching of the breast area constitute manual-genital 
contact?" And my answer is reread the instructions. 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Now, the questions were in order to have lewd -
THE COURT: Committed manual-genital contact, does it require touching 
the vaginal area? Does touching the breast area constitute manual-
genital contact? 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think the answer is no. 
THE COURT: No, the answer is reread the instructions. I'm not going to 
define for them manual-genital. . . . \ 
[PROSECUTOR]: ... I think the court is correct because I think they have 
a two-part question, does it include the vaginal area and does it the [sic] 
include breast. So, I mean, how can you say no? 
THE COURT: Yeah, you can't. 
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[PROSECUTOR]: You have to read the instructions. I think the 
instructions are clear. 
THE COURT: Well, if the jury - I do not feel comfortable defining, and, in 
fact, there's case law that says not only should you default to the standard 
instructions, but that while - while it may seem - it's tempting to want to 
define every single word, that it's inappropriate for the court to do so and 
that the jurors have to apply their understanding - their common ordinary 
understanding to it. And, therefore, I'm just going to tell them to reread the 
instructions. 
(Tr., p.544, L.9 - p.545, L.17.) 
Crawford does not contend that the court's instructions were erroneous. (See 
Appellant's Brief, pp.6-10.) Indeed, the district court did not incorrectly instruct or 
mislead the jury in any express way; it initially gave correct instructions, and after the 
jury submitted its question, the court requested the jury reread the same instructions. 
Because the jury instructions did not mislead the jury or prejudice Crawford, there is 
basis for reversible error based on the instructions that were given. See Row, 131 
Idaho at 310, 955 P.2d at 1089. 
Crawford argues that "the district court was obligated to instruct the jury that 
touching of the breast area could not constitute lewd conduct," and that the jury was 
"potentially considering that breast area touching could constitute lewd conduct." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) He concludes that "the failure to clarify that touching the breast 
area could not constitute lewd conduct permitted the jury to find [him] guilty of conduct 
that does not constitute the crime for which he was charged." (Id.) Because the 
instructions given the jury were correct, the decision of whether to further instruct the 
jury that breasts are not genitals was discretionary. Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 282, 77 
P.3d at 971. 
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by not defining the word "genital." 
"Genital" is a commonly understood term, and by sending the jury back into the jury 
room to reread the instructions, the district court was, in essence, telling the jurors to 
use their common sense and follow the jury instructions. See Wikipedia, "Genitals," 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genitals#References ("The visible portion of the human 
genitals for males consists of scrotum and a penis, for females it consists of the labia, 
clitoris and vagina."); see I.C. § 18-1507 (2)(d), (e), and (g) (defining Sexual Exploitation 
of a Child by listing genitals separate from breasts). Crawford has failed to demonstrate 
how the district court's refusal to define such a commonly understood word was an 
abuse of discretion. 
Crawford cites State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 342, 256 P.3d 735, 750 (2011 ), to 
support the principle that, if the instructions to the jury do not match the allegations in 
the charging document, "there can be a fatal variance between the jury instructions and 
the charging document." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Despite reciting a correct statement 
on variance law, Crawford's appellate brief does not assert a variance occurred in his 
case. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.6-13.) Moreover, in Folk, it was the district 
court's response to a jury question that was found to have potentially misled the jury 
and created a fatal variance by allowing Folk to be convicted of lewd conduct for acts 
different than the oral-genital contact he was charged with under the lewd conduct 
statute. Folk, 151 Idaho at 342, 256 P.3d at 750. In contrast, the district court did 
nothing overt to mislead the jury in Crawford's trial; it simply told the jury to reread the 
jury instructions. 
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Moreover, the district court accurately stated: 
... [T]here's case law that says not only should you default to the 
standard instructions, but that while - while it may seem - it's tempting to 
want to define every single word, that it's inappropriate for the court to do 
so and that the jurors have to apply their understanding - their common 
ordinary understanding to it. 
(Tr., p.545, Ls.9-16.) Reviewing courts have frequently found that instructing a jury to 
reread its instructions is sufficient. State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 135, 44 P.3d 1180, 
1190 (Ct. App. 2002) Oury asked court what "principal" and guilty as a principal" meant, 
and court told it to reread the instructions, which response was approved by the 
appellate court); State v. Henry, 138 Idaho 364, 366 n.3, 63 P.3d 490, 492 n.3 (Ct. App. 
2003) ("Finally, he argues that the court's response to the jury's questions about 
entrapment misled or misinformed the jury, a position without merit where the court 
merely advised the jury to reread Instructions 4 and 19."); see Massey v. State, 803 
N.E.2d 1133, 1137 (Ind. App. 2004) ("Prior to the adoption of Indiana's new Jury Rules, 
the generally accepted procedure in answering a jury's question on a matter of law was 
to reread all of the instructions in order to avoid emphasizing any particular point and 
not to qualify, modify, or explain its instructions in any way.") Idaho courts have 
consistently held that terms which "are of common usage and are sufficiently generally 
understood" need not be further defined when instructing the jury. State v. Zichko, 129 
Idaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971 (1996); State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho 561, 564-65, 21 
P.3d 498, 501-02 (Ct. App. 2001). 
Even when a juror expresses confusion to the trial court about commonly 
understood terms in the jury instructions, the trial court need not define the terms. In 
10 
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956, a case involving the first-degree murder of a bail 
bondsman who was attempting to apprehend Sheahan for jumping bail, one of the 
jurors asked the district court during jury deliberations (1) if the phrase "any place" 
"require[s] a home or is that just any city or is it anywhere?" and (2) whether "necessary 
force" means "bodily force or force, just any kind of force, a thing to get that arrest?" kl 
at 282-83, 77 P.3d at 971-72. The Idaho Supreme Court held it was not error for the 
district court to refuse to define those commonly understood terms, explaining: 
... [T]he district court did not abuse its discretion in not answering the 
questions of the jurors. The plain language of the instruction was a 
sufficient answer to the questions; the requests for further definitions of 
common terms were properly rejected within the discretion of the trial 
court. 
kl at 284, 77 P.3d at 973 (emphasis added). Just as the Idaho Supreme Court ruled in 
Sheahan, the district court in Crawford's trial was not obligated to define common terms 
for the jury. 3 Because "breasts" and "genitals" are commonly understood terms, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion or commit any error in telling the jury to reread 
its instructions instead of defining the word "genitals." Crawford has not presented any 
authority directly supporting his argument that, even though the district court correctly 
instructed the jury, it was obligated to clarify the meaning of a commonly understood 
word; therefore, his argument must be rejected. 
3 Cf. Dawson v. Olson, 97 Idaho 274, 282, 543 P.2d 499, 507 (1975) (holding the trial 
court had a duty to clarify a point of law (the definition of proximate cause) "when the 
jury returned to court indicating its confusion"). 
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D. Any Error Is Harmless In Regard To Count II - Lewd Conduct Upon An.C. 
Even if the district court erred in not instructing the jury that breasts are not 
genitals, such an error would be harmless regarding Count II because that count did not 
involve any testimony or allegation that Crawford touched An.C.'s breasts. In Folk, one 
of the three instructional errors the Idaho Supreme Court found was deemed harmless. 
That errorwas a variance between the district court's jury instructions (which allowed all 
statutorily defined physical contact combinations to prove lewd conduct) and the 
charging document (specifying only oral-genital contact). Folk, 151 Idaho at_, 256 
P.3d at 748. The Court explained: 
Including genital-genital contact, genital-anal contact, manual-genital 
contact, manual-anal contact, and oral-anal contact in the jury instruction 
had no relevance to this case. Although it may have been harmless to 
have done so, since there was no evidence of any such contact, jury 
instructions should not include irrelevant information. 
kl (emphasis added). Similarly, in Crawford's case, even if the jury was uncertain 
whether breasts are genitals, because "there was no evidence of any such contact" (see 
id.) in regard to Count II, any error was harmless as to that charge. 
Count II of the Indictment does not mention breasts -- only Count IV does.4 In 
her testimony, An.C. revealed only one incident when Crawford touched her breasts, 
4 Count II reads: 
That the defendant, SHANE ERICK CRAWFORD, between 2007 
and 2008, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did willfully and lewdly, 
commit a lewd and lascivious act with the body of a minor, AC., under the 
age of sixteen (16) years, to-wit: of the age of fourteen (14) years, by 
having manual to genital contact, with the intent to appeal to and/or gratify 
the sexual desire of the defendant and/or said minor child. 
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and that was during the UFC party when Crawford "grabbed [An.C.'s] boob and said 
that [An.C. was] growing boobs and did it in like a joking manner." (Tr., p.252, Ls.5-8.) 
Conversely, during An.C.'s testimony about Count II, she related that when she and 
Crawford were in the kitchen together, Crawford asked her if she knew what a "clit" was, 
and he then came at her and put his hands outside her vaginal area by having his 
hands move up from the bottom of her shorts, and said nothing about her breasts being 
touched. (Tr., p.242, L.3 - p.243, L.19.) Similarly, both the prosecutor's and Crawford's 
closing arguments showed their understanding that Count 11 did not involve any charge 
or allegation that Crawford touched An.C.'s breasts.5 Lastly, Jury Question No. 3, 
asking whether breasts are genitals, did not reflect any misunderstanding about whether 
(R., p.12.) 
(Id.) 
Count IV, on which Crawford was acquitted, reads: 
That the defendant, SHANE ERICK CRAWFORD, between 2008 and 
2009, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did have sexual contact with 
AC., a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, to-wit: between fourteen 
(14) and fifteen (15) years of age, by rubbing A.C.'s thighs and/or breasts, 
with the intent to appeal to and/or gratify the sexual desire of the 
defendant and/or said minor child. 
5 The prosecutor told the jury, "Count Two is [An.C.] and this is the episode where 
[An.C.] testified he asked her if she knew what her clit was and he put his fingers up. 
That's what Count Two is referring to. . . . And Count Four is when he grabs her 
breasts and also when he's rubbing up toward her panty line getting closer and closer." 
(Tr., p.512, Ls.5-16.) 
Crawford's trial counsel stated in closing argument, "[An.C.], you know, Count 
Two, again, this is a pretty broad area to cover here as far as when this occurred, 
between 2007 and 2008. [An.C.'s] claiming that her father at some point mentioned 
something about, do you know what a clit is, and made a move toward her and she said 
she jumped back." (Tr., p.518, L.23 - p.519, L.4.) 
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breasts were part of the conduct alleged in Count II, and Jury Question No. 4 accurately 
stated that Count II concerned "[An.C.] being asked about 'clit."' (See Jury Questions 
## 3, 4, Order Granting Mot. to Aug. the Record, 12/13/11.) 
The record unequivocally demonstrates that any question the jury may have had 
as to whether breasts are considered genitals was not relevant to, and could not have 
affected, Count II. Because there was no allegation in the charging document, no 
testimony, and no argument even hinting that Crawford may have touched An.C.'s 
breasts in regard to Count 11, any error by the district court's response to the jury's third 
question was harmless as to that count. 
11. 
Crawford Has Failed To Establish His Sentences Are Excessive 
A. Introduction 
Crawford asserts the district court abused its discretion in imposing concurrent 
sentences of twenty-five years with six years fixed for his two lewd conduct convictions. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.13-17.) He argues that the district court "failed to give proper 
consideration to his prior military service and honorable discharge," and that he has 
support from family, friends, and co-workers, who all spoke highly of him. (Id.) Last, 
Crawford acknowledges that the psychosexual evaluation ("PSE") found him a 
moderate risk to reoffend and not amenable for treatment because he maintains his 
innocence, but points out a polygraph examination showed no deception when he 
denied sexual contact with As.C. and An .C. (Id. at 16-17 .) Crawford has failed to 
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establish an abuse of discretion given the nature of the offenses, his criminal history, 
and the objectives of sentencing. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A district court's sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27,218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
In order to demonstrate an abuse of the district court's sentencing discretion, 
Crawford must "establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence 
was excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover, 140 
Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). Those objectives are: "(1) protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe, 99 
Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978). Crawford cannot meet his burden in this 
case. In fashioning appropriate sentences, the district court considered the seriousness 
of Crawford's offenses, criminal history, unlikelihood of being rehabilitated due to his 
continued claim of innocence, and the danger he presents to the community. 
Crawford reportedly had sexual contact with As.C. once, when she was 13 years 
old; while they watched a movie on the living room couch, he groped her breasts and 
put his hand down her panties and began touching her vagina. (Tr., p.196, L.3 - p.197, 
L.25; p.199, Ls.2-25.) Crawford had sexual contact with An.C. on several occasions: 
(1) at some unspecified location when she was about 13 years old, Crawford touched 
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her upper thigh, and then went "up there to [her] privates" (Tr., p.238, L.20 - p.239, 
L.20; p.241, L.20 - p.242, L.2); (2) when she was in the eighth grade and in their 
kitchen, Crawford asked her what a "clit" was, and when she told him she did not know, 
he said, "Well, let me show you," and "touched "[o]utside of [her] vaginal area" by using 
his hands to go up her shorts (Tr., p.242, Ls.16-18; p. 243, Ls.10-19); (3) when she was 
about 13, she would be sitting on the couch watching television, and Crawford would 
put a blanket over both of them, and rub from her upper thigh upward toward her 
privates and "outside of [her] bikini line" (Tr., p.244, L.17 - p.245, L.21); (4) during a 
UFC party at the house, while one of his friends was present, Crawford grabbed An.C.'s 
left breast in "like a ha-ha, funny type of way" (Tr., p.251, Ls.12-24; p.252, L.5 - p. 253, 
L.11 ); and (5) while talking to her ill grandfather on the phone, Crawford rubbed her 
stomach, and "would start moving toward [her] shirt and [she] kept having to push his 
hand away numerous times" (Tr., p.253, L.22 - p.254, L.13). Although not actual sexual 
contact, while wrapping presents in Crawford's bedroom around Christmas 2008, 
Crawford exposed his penis to her and said something about having shaved it, and 
when she turned her head away, he told her, "Just look at it." (Tr., p.249, L.7 - p.250, 
L.18; p.258, Ls.18-23.) Crawford would sometimes take An.C. into the garage and tell 
her "not to say anything to [her] mom and to just keep it between [her] and him." (Tr., 
p.247, Ls.6-12.) As.C. and An.C. testified at the sentencing hearing that their family had 
a dramatic breakup after Crawford's crimes were reported; their three brothers no 
longer associated with the girls. (See generally Tr., p.577, L.16 - p.580, L.19.) 
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At the time of sentencing, Crawford had one felony conviction on his record for 
an incident that occurred after he sexually abused his daughters. That incident involved 
Crawford having sexual contact with a fourteen year-old neighbor girl ("D.C."), described 
as follows: 
[D.C.'s mother] told officers that her 14-year-old daughter, [D.C.], was 
sleeping over at a neighbor's house when the neighbor, Shane Crawford, 
34, pulled down [D.C.'s] underwear and penetrated her vagina with his 
finger and was licking her vagina with his tongue. 
[D.C.] had told her mother that she woke up to Shane touching her. 
Shane's wife, Tracy, walked into the room and yelled, "What the fuck are 
you doing?" Mr. Crawford jumped off the bed and followed his wife 
downstairs. [D.C.] pulled up her panties and put on her personal clothes. 
She said Tracy was extremely upset at Shane and was threatening to call 
the police. Shane walked [D.C.] back to her house. 
When officers questioned Mr. Crawford, he smelled strongly of alcohol. 
He stated [D.C.] had also been drinking alcohol. When asked why he had 
[D.C.] come over to his house to make smores, he said he did not think 
she was all that intoxicated. He later told officers that he "didn't really 
believe she was all that drunk," but said he felt he was doing a 
"fatherly/parent duty" by waking her up to give her some Tylenol. He said 
he woke her a second time because he was concerned for her safety due 
to her intoxication .... Mr. Crawford denied performing oral sex on [D.C.], 
saying there was not enough time before his wife came in the room. 
The DNA Results Report regarding the victim's external genital swab 
indicates the "presence of an elevated level of amylase, an enzymatic 
component of saliva." DNA Reports also indicate [D.C.] could not be 
eliminated from being the source of DNA found on the defendant's hand 
swab. Shane Crawford was charged with Lewd Conduct With a Minor 
Under 16. 
(1/25/10 PSI, p.2.) Crawford entered a guilty plea to an amended charge of felony 
injury to child for the incident involving D.C., and after being sentenced to ten years with 
four years fixed, was placed in the retained jurisdiction program. (PSI, 1/28/10 
"Judgment of Conviction and Order of Retained Jurisdiction.") Prior to his February 2, 
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2011 sentencing hearing for Crawford's crimes against his daughters, the district court 
relinquished its jurisdiction in Crawford's injury to child case, and remanded him to the 
Idaho State Board of Correction for execution of judgment. (PSI, 5/21/10 "Order 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction.") 
At the sentencing hearing in this case, the district court detailed six "corrective 
actions" taken against Crawford while he was in the retained jurisdiction program, which 
indicated that he had a significant problem with following rules. (Tr., p.603, Ls.3-22, 
p.604, L.11 - p.608, L.25.) The court found it surprising, given Crawford's age (36) and 
military background, that he was not able to follow rules. (Id.) Crawford's behavior 
while in the retained jurisdiction program told the court "a lot about [his] amenability to 
being out in the community." (Tr., p.609, Ls.1-3.) 
The court also noted that the psychosexual evaluation indicated Crawford has 
"antisocial personality and that [he] tended to seek out positions of power and status 
and that (heJ had a propensity toward alcohol abuse." (Tr., p.614, L.24 - p.615, L.4; see 
1/14/11 PSE, p.1.) The court stated that Crawford's psychosexual evaluation 
determined that Crawford is very manipulative, which the court found was "very clear" 
from his performance in the retained jurisdiction program. (Tr., p.604, Ls.4-7; see 
1/14/11 PSE, pp.14, 17.) The district court considered the potential danger Crawford 
posed to the community, pointing out that the psychosexual evaluation concluded 
Crawford was a "moderate" risk to reoffend, and he was "not currently amenable for sex 
offender treatment because of [his] lack of acknowledgment of inappropriate sexual 
behavior." (Tr., p.615, Ls.12-20; see 1/14/11 PSE, p.1.) In response to Crawford's 
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counsel's attempt to minimize the significance of what a moderate risk means, the court 
explained that being a moderate risk to reoffend does not mean Crawford is a low risk. 
(Tr., p.592, L.24- p.593, L.13; p.615, Ls.12-14.) 
Crawford's argument that his sentences are excessive in light of his prior military 
service and the support he has from family, friends, and co-workers, is not persuasive. 
Although having the support of family and friends and honorable military service are 
valuable assets, the district court was not compelled to give much weight to that factor 
in comparison to other factors. State v. Dushkin, 124 Idaho 184, 186, 857 P.2d 663, 
665 (Ct. App. 1993). Moreover, Crawford's mention, on appeal, that he "submitted to 
polygraph examinations which showed no deception when he denied having sexual 
contact with the alleged victims" (Appellant's Brief, p.17) is completely irrelevant. The 
district properly declined to consider the results of Crawford's polygraph examination. 
(Tr., p.584, Ls.9-12; p.595, L.21 - p.596, L.15.) See Fodge v. State, 125 Idaho 882, 
887, 876 P.2d 164, 169 (Ct. App. 1994) ("[O]nce the jury determined Fodge's guilt, the 
results of the polygraph examination would be entirely irrelevant to sentencing."). 
The primary sentencing consideration in Idaho remains the protection of society. 
State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 627, 873 P.2d 877, 881 (1994) (citing State v. Moore, 
78 Idaho 359,363,304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956)). Before announcing sentence, the 
district court said it was applying "all of the Toohill factors,"6 and wanted to make sure 
that "the sentence fulfills the objective of protecting the community as well as the victims 
in this case." (Tr., p.602, Ls.17-23.) In its concluding remarks, the district court 
6 See State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982) (citing 
the four sentencing criteria from Wolfe, 99 Idaho at 384, 582, P.2d at 730). 
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highlighted Crawford's false perception that he is not a sex offender, the impact his 
offenses had on his family, and his lack of amenability to treatment due to his refusal to 
admit his offenses: 
(The psychosexual evaluator] said that you did not perceive yourself as a 
sex offender and commented, and I'll quote, "I have done all that I could to 
prove I never touched my daughters to sexually gratify myself or them. 
I'm not denying there was a boundary issue. However, there's a world of 
difference between a teenage girl feeling uncomfortable with a certain 
situation and one being sexual. Incidental contact is not a sexual offense 
in and of itself." 
I thought that was an interesting comment because what it tells me 
is that you have a deep belief that it's appropriate for a father to touch his 
daughter who is a teenager, to touch her breasts, to touch her vaginal 
area, that you think that's appropriate because that's incidental because 
somehow you weren't doing it for sexual gratification. I'm here to tell you it 
is not appropriate. Fathers do not do that. Put yourself in their position. 
You were somebody they trusted. You are their father. And you violated 
them in a very significant way. 
Now, an aggravating - one of the aggravators in this case in my 
view is the impact this has had on the family. In listening to the victim 
impact statement, it is clear that at the root of some of the damage that's 
been done, is that family has been deeply divided. Deeply. And that's 
unfortunate because at a time when these girls need the support of their 
entire family, they do not have that. And that's because of your actions, 
Mr. Crawford. 
So the bottom line here is, I don't believe that you are amenable to 
treatment at this point. I believe that you need to be incarcerated for a 
significant period of time because only in that case will you finally admit to 
yourself the behavior that you had engaged in and the damage that you 
have done to your daughters and to your entire family - you've also done 
the same damage to your sons. You have damaged all of them. 
(Tr., p.615, L.24 - p.617, L.14.) 
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Given all of the information available to the district court when it imposed 
sentence, Crawford has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that, under any 
reasonable view of the facts, his sentences are excessive. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Crawford's judgment of 
conviction and sentences. 
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